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HITTING THE WALL AS A LEGAL WRITER
Elizabeth Fajans*
At around twenty miles, many marathon runners hit the
wall, experiencing a depletion of glycogen that manifests itself in
a sudden loss of energy and progress. Similarly, many first year
law students who work their way over a semester from low grades
to "B" or "B+" on their written work hit the wall before reaching
the elusive "A" grade. As a legal writing specialist, I often see
these students. They come frustrated, disappointed, and con-
cerned about their grades in a shrinking job market, asking what
they have to do to get an "A" on a paper. As questions go, this is a
hard one.
It is not hard to tell a student how to move from "C's" to "B's."
Something is almost always missing that must be included: an
issue, a rule, a step in reasoning, a conclusion. Something most
always needs development: the court's reasoning, the factual ap-
plication, the counter-arguments, or the solution. Sometimes the
student must show better judgment in the selection of cases, or
holdings must be stated more accurately. Sometimes the paper
lacks an IRAC-type organization, or there are citation and sen-
tence errors. There may be a lot to do, but the problems can be
easily identified and clearly explained to a student.
Telling a student what is wrong with a "B+" or "A-" paper is
harder. Admittedly, the student may have written a paper that is
strong in some areas, but weaker in others: a variation on the
problems of "C" or "B" papers.1 But the student "may be doing
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1. One teacher expressed the sentiment of many on this. "To me, each B+ or A- paper
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everything expected, and doing it pretty well,"2 and yet the work
lacks pizzazz, some value-added factor3 that shows competence
plus something more.
Not only are these value-added factors harder to identify and
teach, but there are political and pedagogical considerations that
make answers tricky. Different professors may be looking for dif-
ferent things or have different standards.4 Different legal docu-
seems strong in particular areas and not as strong in others. For example, for some, the
real difference might be slightly less effective use of authority, while for others it might be
the level of elegance and sophistication of language." Email from Linda Edwards, E.L.
Cord Found. Prof. Law, UNLV William S. Boyd Sch. L., to Elizabeth Fajans, Assoc. Prof.
Leg. Writing & Writing Specialist, Brooklyn L. Sch., A Papers (Jan. 21, 2010, 7:52 p.m.
EST) (copy on file with Author).
2. Email from Kris Franklin, Prof. Law & Dir. Academic Support, N.Y. L. Sch., to
Elizabeth Fajans, Assoc. Prof. Leg. Writing & Writing Specialist, Brooklyn L. Sch., A Pa-
pers (July 12, 2010, 12:05 p.m. EST) (copy on file with Author); see infra text accompany-
ing n. 17.
3. Email from Ruth McKinney, Clinical Prof. Law, U. N.C. Sch. L., to Elizabeth Fa-
jans, Assoc. Prof. Leg. Writing & Writing Specialist, Brooklyn L. Sch., A Papers (July 7,
2010, 9:32 a.m. EST) (copy on file with Author).
The writing specialist at Seattle describes the work of a B+ student as "competent,
maybe a little unimaginative, and it may be subtly off on things like emphasis." Email
from Anne Enquist, Prof. Lawyering Skills & Dir. Leg. Writing Program, Seattle U. Sch.
L., to Elizabeth Fajans, Assoc. Prof. Leg. Writing & Writing Specialist, Brooklyn L. Sch., A
Papers (Oct. 2, 2009, 3:30 p.m. PST) (copy on file with Author).
4. In the exam context, Professor Kissam contrasts the answer key/score sheet meth-
od of grading, which tends to award issue spotting, identification of legal authorities, and
application, with a holistic approach more responsive to "a general understanding, inferen-
tial abilities, analytic abilities, and practical judgment." Phillip C. Kissam, Law School
Examinations, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 433, 445 (1989). Professor Fines notes that "different
[professors] produce grades in different ways, taking into account different criteria, includ-
ing comparison to peers, comparison to evaluative criteria, effort, growth, or behavioral
compliance [with deadlines, page length, etc.]." Barbara Glesner Fines, Competition and
the Curve, 65 UMKC L. Rev. 879, 880 (1997). These differences lead to the classic "stories
about discrepancies among professors-the apparently inappropriate generosity or harsh-
ness of individual faculty members." Robert C. Downs & Nancy Levit, If It Can't Be Lake
WoeBegone... A Nationwide Survey of Law School Grading and Grade Normalization
Practices (Jan. 1997) (available at http://works.bepress.com/nancylevit/20). Professors
Clark and DeSanctis echo this concern. "When several years ago our institution proposed
moving to a letter-graded ... system .... one of the central concerns involved how to en-
sure that our ... professors would use the same standards for assessing papers. Would it
be possible for a professor to assign a B to a paper primarily because that professor "over-
valued,"' for example, the Statement of Facts in a trial brief and thus attributed more
points to that section than to any other section, and more points than another professor? .
.. Would a creative use of policy argument in an appellate brief stand out to one professor,
but strike another as a throwaway argument?" Jessica Clark & Christy DeSanctis, Toward
a Unified Grading Vocabulary: Using Grading Rubrics to Set Student Expectations and
Promote Consistency in Legal Writing Courses, __ J. Leg. Educ. - (forthcoming) (ms. at
5-6) (available at Geo. Wash. U. Leg. Stud. Research no. 574, http://ssrn.com/abstract=189
0832). Although concerned, these two teachers think this problem can be overcome by
rubrics that set expectations, "but accommodate both professor and student stylistic choic-
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ments call for different criteria.5 Standards change depending
upon level of education and degree of experience. 6 Rubrics and
grade point sheets, if used, may be insufficiently nuanced at the
upper end, 7 and even if nuanced, an institution's mandatory curve
or mean may skew and confound rubrics and grading criteria.8
Nonetheless, we owe it to our students to identify some of the
es." Id. at 23.
5. For example, a teacher will look for a reasoned prediction about the probable out-
come of a case in an office memorandum, a persuasive framing of the case in a brief, or the
clear articulation of a problem in the law and an original, insightful, and pragmatic solu-
tion in a seminar paper.
6. Professors often modify standards or "rubrics according to the level of the course."
Sophie M. Sparrow, Describing the Ball: Improve Teaching by Using Rubrics-Explicit
Grading Criteria, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev 1, 25. As Professor McKinney said, "[Tihe quali-
ties that make an "A" paper an "A" are directly related (obviously) to the underlying as-
signment itself. Assignments from early in the semester may only demand insights re-
garding the holding in one particular case. By the end of the first year, the kinds of in-
sights that would make me smile are those that include insights about individual cases,
about how the cases (or other controlling law) weave together, and how the policy behind
the laws can be expressed through wise application or modification of the law." Email from
Ruth McKinney, Clinical Prof Law, U. N.C. Sch. L., to Elizabeth Fajans, Assoc. Prof. Leg.
Writing & Writing Specialist, Brooklyn L. Sch., A Papers (July 23, 2011, 4:23 p.m. EST)
(copy on file with Author).
7. Formative assessments, that is, rubrics that "describe both what the students
should learn and how they will be evaluated," Sparrow, supra n. 6, at 6, are more effective
than summative assessments that come too late to assist in a student's development. In
addition, rubrics that describe the characteristics of excellent, good, and weak student
work are often more helpful than a checklist that establishes general criteria. Compare the
general criteria rubric in Melissa Shafer, Effective Assessment: Detailed Criteria, Check-
Grading, and Student Samples, 14 Second Draft 6 (1999), with level-specific criteria like
those in Jessica Clark & Christy DeSanctis's article, supra n. 4, or Sophie Sparrow's arti-
cle, supra n. 6. Nonetheless, even the most specific guidelines seem to stress predictive
analysis rather than innovative ideas. And while many rubrics stress clarity, few stress
other rhetorical techniques that can have significant impact on readers. This is why So-
phie Sparrow cautions that rubrics need constant refinement to add complexities con-
sistent with our goals for student learning. Sparrow, supra n. 6, at 34.
8. Whatever the merits of a required curve, it does create grading problems. As Ste-
ven Friedland notes, 'The desire, even mandate, of many schools to impose grading curves
exacerbates the reliability of grade distinctions. Whether called for or not, curves require
instructors to distribute evaluations and make qualitative distinction between papers that
are sometimes quite similar in substance. Ironically, the imposition of a grading curve
necessitates a more subjective, norm-referenced grading, in which professors judge stu-
dents against other students in the class, not against some objective, standardized meas-
ure." A Critical Inquiry into the Traditional Uses of Law School Evaluation, 23 Pace L.
Rev. 147, 184-185 (2002). As one professor more cynically comments,
[i]f a student asks a professor, "How do I earn an A in this class?" A
professor operating under a policy of required means and distributions
cannot simply describe the criteria of a good exam answer. For a stu-
dent in such a class, fulfilling each of these criteria is neither necessary
nor sufficient. The truly honest answer is, "Do more and better than
90% of your classmates ..
Fines, supra n, 4, at 896.
The Journal of the Legal Writing Institute
qualities that might turn competent work into impressive work,
even if we can provide them no guarantees that the grade will
improve.
In this essay, Part I describes what some teachers say they
reward with high grades. Part II then scrutinizes successful stu-
dent papers in an effort to articulate and illustrate some value-
added factors. These successful papers exhibit independent and
often original thinking, as well as novel application. More surpris-
ingly, perhaps, some papers are written with art and style.
I. WHAT TEACHERS SAY MERITS THE "A"
In asking colleagues how they answer the question "how can I
get an 'A,"' one friend responded, "I'm always tempted to say 'evi-
dence of independent thought'--but how do I explain what that
looks like?"9 This response reminded me of Justice Stewart's fa-
mous comment on hard-core pornography: "I shall not today at-
tempt to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced
within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never suc-
ceed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the
motion picture involved in this is not that."10 I have little doubt
that law professors know "A" work when they see it. But like oth-
er categories that lack clearly defined parameters, explanations
for their judgments, like those below, are often surprisingly sub-
jective and general.
Explanation I
My most craven desire. . is for the beautiful, perfect
exam.
The exam that makes me leap out of my chair for joy.
The exam that makes me want to cry. The exam that I
don't think I could have written any better myself, and in
fact, may be better than what I would have written, for it
contains some insights and some analysis that did not oc-
9. Email from Linda Berger, Fam. Found. Prof. Law, UNLV William S. Boyd Sch.
Law, to Elizabeth Fajans, Assoc. Prof. Leg. Writing & Writing Specialist, Brooklyn L. Sch.,
A Papers (Jan. 22, 2010, 9:51 a.m. EST) (copy on file with Author).
10. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
[Vol. 18
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cur to me even as I carefully constructed the hypothet-
ical.11
Explanation II
I do think those [papers showing evidence of inde-
pendent thought] are the papers that I give the highest
grades to-as long as they also do most of what I ex-
pected-and I occasionally will indicate in class that I'm
always happy to see a good argument that I had not
thought of-but I don't say it very loud or very often for
fear they will go crazy on me. 12
Explanation III
The problem with using a rubric [to help students
achieve "A" work] is that it misses the "magic" that some
"A" papers have-the value-added factor that makes the
paper shine (despite a few typos or bluebooking errors
throughout). It has to do with weight or insight or logic
or something. The closest I can come to telling my stu-
dents what I'm looking for is this it to tell them that the
rubric is not an elements test. It is a factors test and a
balancing test. Some of the factors definitely weigh-in
heavier than others.' 3 . . . The thing that is MOST im-
portant is pristine logic followed by precise communica-
tion of that logic. That's it. If you've got both, you've got
an "A." (And if it's a persuasive piece rather than objec-
tive, it has to sing like a harmonic note.) 14
Intermingled with comments about how teachers react to
student work are nuggets of information about what they prize:
original insight, independent thought, pristine logic and commu-
11. Ruthann Robson, The Zen of Grading, 36 Akron L. Rev. 303, 320 (2003).
12. Berger email, supra n. 9.
13. Clark and DeSanctis essentially agree with this notion. 'The most critical ele-
ments of a rubric are that it is sufficiently detailed so as to announce expectations and, to
some extent, circumscribe the number of points associated with each element, while at the
same time providing enough flexibility to the professor to distinguish between and among
papers at a level of nuance that is impossible to capture according to a purely objective
methodology." Clark & DeSanctis, supra n. 4, at ms. 7.
14. McKinney email, supra n. 3.
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nication. Another professor adds to this list, stating he values
seminar papers because they push students beyond analysis and
application and force them to deal with greater intellectual com-
plexities like "the uncertainties, value conflicts, and concurrent
intellectual frustrations that pervade the practice of law and that
become critical for effective professional practice." 15 These intel-
lectual goals comport with Benjamin Bloom's germinal work on
taxonomy of educational objectives, a taxonomy that organized
cognitive operations into a hierarchy of conceptual thinking (in
ascending order: Remembering, Understanding, Applying, Ana-
lyzing, Evaluating, and Creating).16 Kris Franklin, the director of
academic support at New York Law School, describes how she
uses Bloom's hierarchy in explaining her grading criteria to stu-
dents.
Explanation IV
In my own grading I think I intuitively and, perhaps
unconsciously, draw a distinction between work that
earns an "A" and work that falls unequivocally into the
"A paper" category. That is, I think I give a lot more "A's"
than I really see unquestionably "A" work .... To me,
doing everything that is expected, and doing it all pretty
well, is solid "B+" work. As far as I'm concerned, "B+"
work can sometimes back into getting an "A" or "A-"
grade, but it isn't quite the same thing as doing "A" work.
.... When I'm explaining the difference I usually end up
talking about "A" work as involving a complete under-
standing of the problem and a thorough and competent
attempt to resolve it, while weaving these together in
ways that show not just mastery but terrific legal judg-
ment and often genuine creativity.
The best tool I've found for making this comprehen-
sible to students is a little flip chart describing the hier-
archy of modes of thought in Bloom's Taxonomy. 17 . . .
[This] flip chart is filled with examples of the kinds of
15. Phillip C. Kissam, Seminar Papers, 40 J. Leg. Educ. 539, 540 (1990).
16. Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: The Classification of Educational Goals,
Handbook I. Cognitive Domain (Benjamin S. Bloom ed., David McKay Co., Inc. 1956).
17. Quick Flip Questions for Critical Thinking (EDUPRESS 2001).
[Vol. 18
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questions students can ask at each level of thinking that
the Taxonomy envisions. (The questions themselves are
useful tools, even though the chart isn't designed for law
at all.) But then I group the levels and point out that the
first two, Remembering and Understanding, are both ex-
pected and required in their graduate/professional train-
ing, so that working on that level gets them only to about
a "C-" (students around the room groan when I ask them
what levels the bulk of their outline and other review
materials operate on, because it is almost always here).
I then tell them that the next two of Bloom's Levels,
Applying and Analyzing ... should be the bulk of what
students are doing with any problem, and are what is
needed to get anywhere in the "B" range. I remind stu-
dents that this is where most of their energy should go,
and that how well they do this will almost always be the
difference between high "B" work and low "B" work, and
sometimes, can get them in the "A" range.
But to draft what I think of as truly "A" work, stu-
dents must fully develop their Level III/IV analysis, but
then pass on at least briefly at least to Level V, "Evaluat-
ing," or occasionally, even Level VI, "Creating." Seeing it
laid out in a chart this way, and sometimes critiquing
their own or other students papers to determine what
levels of thinking they're working on where, helps stu-
dents viscerally feel the difference between A and B pa-
pers more concretely.18
Professor Franklin's observation that evaluation and creative
thinking, Bloom's two highest cognitive operations, are key to ex-
celling in law school has been echoed by others. Judith Wegner
notes that
[a]lthough faculty in many classrooms dwell on compre-
hension, analysis, and simple application and synthesis,
that's not all that we evaluate. Most essay examinations
require complicated application, complicated synthesis,
18. Franklin email, supra n. 2.
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and complicated evaluation, and we don't teach that
nearly enough.'19
Professor Friedland suggests law schools "adapt Bloom's pyramid
of learning to [their] educational process[es]. For example, it is
widely acknowledged that mere memorization of rules and princi-
ples are a lower grade of thinking and consequently less valuable
than the application of those principles."20
One first step in helping students to scale the cognitive lad-
der is to explain the type of thinking that goes into creating and
evaluating ideas. Evaluation, one of the cognitive operations at
the top of Bloom's taxonomy, requires probing the validity of a
premise or argument. Evaluation begins with recognizing as-
sumptions behind a premise or argument. This recognition may
require examining, for example, underlying fact statements; in-
terpretations of rules, cases, and policies; and social, cultural, and
legal history. It may also require evaluating inferences made on
the basis of evidence already collected (like the intent of a defend-
ant or a legislature).21 On the basis of these observations, the next
step is to assess the relevance, strength, and sufficiency of the
supporting evidence before reaching a conclusion about the validi-
ty of a narrative, premise, or argument. 22
If, as these teachers imply, sound evaluation often moves a
student from the "B" range to the "A" range, original thinking is
even a better predictor and more of a guarantee. Creative ideas
sometimes come in a flash-in that moment when we awake in
the night with the answer to a problem that has been gnawing at
us. But sometimes ideas need to be puzzled out, requiring us to
experiment with putting material together in innovative ways
that may lead to inventive and pragmatic solutions.
One thing we can do to help students in this endeavor is to
compare the work of high achieving students with work slightly
less finessed in an effort to identify characteristics of superior
19. Judith Wegner, Better Writing, Better Thinking: Thinking Like a Lawyer, 10 Leg.
Writing 9, 18 (2004).
20. Friedland, supra n. 8, at 200 (citing Michael Josephson, Learning and Evaluation
in Law School 4 (Jan. 1984) (unpublished ms. at 58; submitted to American Association of
Law School Annual Meeting)).
21. See Nelson P. Miller & Bradley J. Charles, Meeting the Carnegie Report's Chal-
lenge to Make Legal Analysis Explicit-Subsidiary Skills to the IRAC Framework, 59 J.
Leg. Educ. 192, 212 (2009).
22. Id. at 214. This article elaborated on the cognitive skills involved in evaluation.
[Vol. 18
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work that will make the differences visible and thereby attaina-
ble. We learn from this comparison, as discussed in more detail
in the next section, that sound judgment and original thinking
often results from careful evaluation of the sources of public poli-
cy, from probing the soundness of analogies, from re-
characterizing or reversing roles, and from extending a line of
reasoning beyond its original purpose.2 3
Artful writing is another important characteristic of superior
work, especially in persuasive documents where the theory of the
case must be visible in the way facts and law are framed (though
even in objective documents legal writers want to convince their
readers that the analysis correctly predicts the outcome of a case).
The story upon which the legal case is based must be made suffi-
ciently compelling for the audience to want the narrator's client to
prevail. Persuasion also requires perfect pitch, so readers find a
story plausible, but not coercive. This requires psychological in-
sight and smart ears, ears that hear nuance-the difference be-
tween advocacy and aggression, respect and fawning, rational
persuasion and covert manipulation. This means we should arm
students with "knowledge of how people react to the disclosure of
negative information . . . [to] have a better feel for the winning
strategy."24 Mastery of these, and other, skills may help student
push through the writing barriers they face.
II. VALUE-ADDED FACTORS
Careful evaluation, independent and original thinking, and
artful writing are three attributes that collectively help students
move into the "A" range. And although it is impossible to articu-
late all the ways these attributes can be fulfilled, it is possible to
give examples of each that will pave the way for other discoveries.
Thus, under the category of close evaluation, it might be help-
ful to compare a brief that evaluates and uses non-legal sources
effectively in policy arguments with one that is less accomplished.
Examining a brief that pays close attention to burden of proof
might be educational to students because these procedural issues
23. For a fuller discussion of some of these attributes, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Aha-Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and Teachable in Legal Education? 6
Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 97, 122-123 (2001).
24. Kathryn M. Stanchi, Playing with Fire: The Science of Confronting Adverse Mate-
rial in Legal Advocacy, 60 Rutgers L. Rev. 381, 383 (2008).
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are essential to sound evaluation of a law's applicability, but are
often ignored by law students. Under the category of original
thinking, fresh insight can come from critiquing and comparing
examples that demonstrate independent thought with those that
are more mainstream. Finally, under the category of artful writ-
ing, excerpts that display strategic sequencing, sensitivity to tone,
framing, and foreshadowing can help students learn how to elicit
favorable audience response.
In discussing all the factors that go into a paper, it is im-
portant to remember that they are often interrelated and inextri-
cably intertwined in practice; well-supported policy arguments
can undermine adverse decisions, but an aggressive, bullying tone
can render audiences resistant to the message. Nonetheless, in
the discussions below, I try to focus on one analytical or rhetorical
factor because by identifying each factor clearly, students have
access to the menu of usable techniques.
A. Close Evaluation
1. Using Policy Effectively
Policy plays an important role in cases of first impression and
in statutory cases where attorneys must advocate for the creation
or a particular understanding of a rule. Policy arguments gener-
ally appeal to core interests and values and explain why a rule
will or will not benefit society.25 The identification of a desirable
goal is, of course, a normative evaluation, 26 but one that can gain
credibility if non-legal information convincingly demonstrates
how a policy would work in reality-for good or ill. This support is
important because unchallenged normative goals may unfairly
advantage more powerful groups in society and result in poorly
conceived law. In addition to policy arguments for or against a
rule, lawyers often raise the policy underlying a rule to explain
why it does or does not apply to a client's situation. 27
For policy arguments to be effective, however, law students
need to be familiar with different types of policy arguments and
25. Ellie Margolis, Closing the Floodgates: Making Persuasive Policy Arguments in
Appellate Briefs, 62 Mont. L. Rev. 59, 66 (2001).
26. Ellie Margolis, Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Non-Legal Materials in
Appellate Briefs, 34 U.S.F. L. Rev. 197, 214-215 (2000).
27. Id. at 212.
[Vol. 18
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different types of non-legal authority that often underpin policy
arguments. 28 Yet many students just run a generic Google-type
search and do not know about the science and social science data-
bases that include more reputable sources. Sometimes the stu-
dents do not look beyond the data cited in decisions. Then stu-
dents have even more trouble assessing the validity and the suffi-
ciency of the evidence they are using to support a policy argu-
ment. They need to learn to search for confirmation that the find-
ings are closely related to the issue they are examining and that
the findings "are supported by a substantial body of work and...
have survived critical appraisals by . . .professionals. '" 29 Since
misuse of non-legal information undermines the legitimacy of a
policy argument and the credibility of the advocate, the infor-
mation must be carefully assessed before being incorporated. 30
a. Policy Arguments on a Rule's Desirability
Policy arguments explaining why a rule is or is not desirable
depend heavily on non-legal sources explaining the reasons for
that position. One student's brief explaining why a statute prohib-
iting adoption by unmarried, co-habiting couples is undesirable
demonstrates this use of non-legal sources with aplomb. The
writer uses studies from independent, reputable professional or-
ganizations that have done comprehensive reviews of the relevant
literature, organizations like the American Psychological Associa-
tion or the American Journal of Orthopsychiatry. This selection
shows the writer cares about the legitimacy of supporting sources,
which in turn demonstrates the writer's sound judgment.
The New Devon statute prohibiting unmarried co-
habiting couples from adopting is not rationally related
28. There are four broad categories of policy arguments, although these categories
sometimes become intertwined. Normative arguments are arguments about the values and
goals that a law should promote and include moral arguments, social policy arguments,
and corrective justice arguments. Economic arguments examine the economic consequenc-
es of a rule. Institutional competence arguments are structural arguments about the prop-
er relationship of courts to other courts and courts to other branches of government. And
judicial administration arguments look at the practical effects of a ruling on the admin-
istration of justice. See Helene Shapo et al., Writing and Analysis in the Law 264-265 (5th
ed., Found. Press 2008).
29. Sharon D. Herzberger, Social Science Contributions to the Law: Understanding
and Predicting Behavior, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 1067, 1072 (1993).
30. See Margolis, supra n. 26, at 209.
2012]
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to a legitimate government interest. While providing sta-
ble homes with positive role models for adopted children
is a legitimate goal, the statute prohibiting unmarried
cohabiting couples from adopting does not further that
goal.
According to a brief filed by the American Psycholog-
ical Association for In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757
(2008), which the court cited, a comprehensive survey of
peer-reviewed scientific studies reported no differences
between children raised by lesbians and those raised by
heterosexuals with respect to the factors that matter:
self-esteem, anxiety, depression, behavioral problems,
performance in social arenas, use of psychological coun-
seling, mother's and teacher's reports of children's hy-
peractivity, unsociability, emotional difficulty, or conduct
difficulty. J. Stacey & T.J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual
Orientation of Parents Matter? 66 Am. Soc. Rev. at 169,
171.
State courts have also cited information provided in
the APA's Resolution on Sexual Orientation, Parents, and
Children (2004), which states that empirical research
demonstrates that homosexual couples form stable,
committed relationships. In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL
5006172 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008); In re Marriage Cas-
es, 43 Cal. 4th 757. According to the APA, studies of ho-
mosexual persons "show that the vast majority . . have
been involved in committed relationships . . . that large
proportions are currently involved in such a relationship
(across the studies, roughly 40-70% of gay men and 45-
80% of lesbians), and that a substantial number of those
couples have been together ten or more years." See L.A.
Peplau & L.R. Spalding, The Close Relationships of Les-
bians, Gay Men, and Bisexuals, in Clyde Hendrick & Su-
san Hendrick, Close Relationships: A Sourcebook 114
(Sage Publications 2000); L.A. Kurdek, Lesbians and Gay
Couples, in Anthony R. D'Augelli & Charlotte Patterson,
Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Identities over the Lifespan
243 (1995). Also, research shows that homosexual par-
ents do not differ substantially in their ability to parent a
child. See e.g. Ellen C. Perrin, Sexual Orientation in
Child and Adolescent Health Care 105, 115-116 (2002);
[Vol. 18
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C.A. Parks, Lesbian Parenthood: A Review of the Litera-
ture, 68 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 376 (1998) ....
In contrast to the extensive research and carefully chosen
sources cited in the excerpt above, an opponent's brief in this case
supports the policy underlying the statute at issue, using only one
article written by a law professor rather than an expert in the
field and two cases. No social science research is cited.
The legislative classification of unmarried people is
rational because it is directly related to the statute's ob-
jective to provide adopted children with stable homes.
The Lofton court recognized an "unprovable assumption"
that unmarried couples are less stable than married ones
as a legitimate basis for legislative action. Lofton, 358
F.3d at 819. Marriage holds a legally cognizable significa-
tion of willingness to work together in caring for a child.
Stanley v. Ill., 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1218 (1972) (Burger, J.,
dissenting). It provides couples with legally enforceable
rights and duties to each other and their children and is
symbolic of the couple's commitment to care for their
child. Id. at 1219. Because unmarried couples lack such a
commitment, there is a higher likelihood that they will
separate than there is that a married couple will divorce.
Milton C. Regan, Jr., Calibrated Commitment: The Legal
Treatment of Marriage and Cohabitation, 76 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 1435, 1456 (2001). Families in which parents are
unmarried and can come and go when they please with-
out involvement of the state are patently less stable than
those in which the parents have made a legal commit-
ment to one another. (R. 12). Placing adoptive children in
the homes of such couples directly conflicts with the
state's goal of providing them with a stable living envi-
ronment.
The appellee's brief never went on to say that although the
Lofton court admits that the notion that unmarried couples have
less stable relations than married couples was an "unprovable
assumption," the court said Florida was entitled to make this as-
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sumption because the appellants had offered no "competent evi-
dence to the contrary."31 This is not true in the appellants' brief
quoted above, however. Thus, appellee's brief would have been
stronger if it provided more research supporting its position and
refuting appellants' position.
b. Policy Arguments about Whether a Rule Applies
A second kind of policy argument focuses on why the underly-
ing reasons for a rule do or do not apply to a client's situation. In
the example below, the student writer explains why petitioners in
the client's position should be granted an exception to the imme-
diate custodian rule, which names the warden of a facility where
the prisoner is held as the proper respondent to habeas challeng-
es.
Courts have held that when the government inten-
tionally transfers immigration detainees to make filing a
habeas petition more difficult, the detainees fall within
the exceptions to the immediate custodian rule. The court
in Vazquez recognizes an exception where the INS spirits
"an alien from one site to another in an attempt to ma-
nipulate jurisdiction." 233 F.3d at 696. The Roman court
agreed "an exception might be appropriate if the INS
were to exercise its transfer power in a clear effort to
evade an alien's habeas petitions," although it found the
facts alleged by the Petitioner failed to meet that stand-
ard. Roman, 340 F.3d at 326. To justify such an excep-
tion, however, "[Petitioner] must articulate specific alle-
gations of bad faith and, if necessary, produce reasonably
particularized evidence in support of those allegations."
Costa v. INS, 233 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2000), (quoting
U.S. v. Gertner, 65 F.3d 963 (1st Cir. 1995).
The Government acted in bad faith under the
framework in Costa v. INS by twice transferring Lima
without notice immediately after counsel promised to file
a habeas petition on his behalf. In these situations, it is
logical to extend to immigration detainees the exception
31. Lofton v. Sec. of Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 829 (11th Cir.
2004).
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the Padilla court articulated for federal prisoners, name-
ly that "if there is an indication that the Government's
purpose in removing a prisoner were to make it difficult
for his lawyer to know where the habeas petition should
be filed . . . habeas jurisdiction would be in the district
court from whose territory the petitioner had been re-
moved." Padilla, 542 U.S. at 454 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring).
Here evidence of the government's attempt to manipulate juris-
diction justify applying an exception that makes this conduct im-
permissible.
2. Using Burden of Proof and Standards of Review in
Evaluating Facts
Law students learn fairly early that rules, holdings, and
facts, while not infinitely manipulable, are pliable. As many legal
writing textbooks note, rules can be articulated or interpreted
differently in different decisions, holdings can be framed broadly
or narrowly, and precedent facts can be detailed or general de-
pending on the conclusion the writer wishes to draw. 32 Indeed, the
ability to frame law and use cases persuasively is an expected
part of standard legal analysis. But students are less sensitive to
burden of proof or standard of review issues, and rarely factor
them into the analysis of a case. It is a measure of discrimination
to do so, and an even greater measure when students realize
these procedural rules can also be framed advantageously and
woven into their analysis. For example, standards of proof can be
variously described to minimize or maximize the burden of proof,
and standards of review can be described to give courts greater or
lesser discretion. The first-semester memo below-on whether a
plaintiffs mental health is sufficiently in controversy for a court
to grant an order for a psychiatric exam-is unique in the way
32. See e.g. Linda H. Edwards, Legal Writing: Process, Analysis, and Organization
250-256, 327-329 (4th ed., Aspen Publishers 2006); Richard Neumann, Jr., Legal Reason-
ing and Legal Writing: Structure, Strategy, and Style 18-19, 194-201, 153-154 (6th ed.,
Aspen Publishers 2009); Laurel Currie Oates & Anne Enquist, The Legal Writing Hand-
book: Analysis, Research, and Writing 466-475, 489-490 (4th ed., Aspen Publishers 2006);
Shapo et al, supra n. 28, at 19-20, 101-112, 414-419.
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this novice law student uses the burden and standard of proof in
analyzing and evaluating the facts.
The plaintiffs nine year history of depression and
periodic use of antidepressants while under the care of a
psychiatrist may place her mental health in controversy.
If there is an alternate cause for the alleged harm related
to the mental health of the party, the party's mental
health may be in controversy. Vilkhu.3 3 In Vilkhu, the
complainant suffered from an ongoing hernia that pro-
vided a possible alternate cause of the physical harm al-
legedly caused by the claimed assault. Id. Because the
hernia could have contributed to the alleged physical
harm, the court ordered an exam to determine causation
issues. Id. Similarly, in Hodges, there was evidence that
the complainant suffered from ongoing paranoid schizo-
phrenia, a mental illness that might have affected his
perception of the events underlying his claims of harass-
ment. This condition led the court to rule that the illness
could be an alternate cause of the alleged harm, thus
placing his mental health in controversy. Although mere
allegations of such an illness do not show an individual's
health is "genuinely in controversy" without a "requisite
affirmative showing of proof," Schlagenhauf, the movant
need not prove the merits of his or her case in order to
show more than "mere relevance." Id. An indication that
the exam would "shed light" on remaining claims would
likely suffice.
In the instant case, although the plaintiffs doctor
has asserted that Brown is mentally healthy aside from
periodic spells of depression, this assertion is less forceful
in light of Brown's nine years of ongoing psychiatric care
and repeated use of antidepressants. Like the hernia in
Vilkhu and the paranoid schizophrenia in Hodges,
Brown's prior counseling and use of antidepressants offer
sufficient evidence of ongoing depression that could serve
as alternate cause for the alleged mental distress Brown
suffered during the period of harassment and her recov-
3 Full citations omitted.
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ery. The defendant need not prove causation; it need only
demonstrate that Brown's depression presents an alter-
nate potential cause of the alleged harm such that it
should be permitted to determine the nature and extent
of such a cause. A court could conclude that the source
and pervasiveness of Brown's depression are factual
questions relevant not only to her claim of mental harm,
but also to her claim of harassment.
The thesis sentence clearly foreshadows the writer's conclu-
sion that the plaintiff may fall under an exception to the rule that
the mental health of a party is not generally in controversy if the
harm occurred in the past and is not ongoing. The burden of proof
is phrased to fit that outcome. Even more impressive is the way
the student analyzes the facts in light of the burden of proof, care-
fully evaluating whether the evidence of prolonged depression
places the plaintiffs health in controversy and justifies a psycho-
logical exam because it could "shed light" on the claim. This kind
of attention to procedural issues demonstrates careful evaluation
and solid legal judgment.
B. Independent and Original Thinking
1. Effective Analogies
New ideas often come from seeing analogies, but for the anal-
ogy to work, there must be true similarities between the things
being compared. Those similarities must be easily inferable or
explicitly developed-otherwise, the analogy is unhelpful. Con-
trast the following two briefs on the constitutionality of advanced
imaging technology [AiT] used at airports. Both open by analogiz-
ing full body scans with strip searches, but only the second devel-
ops the analogy enough for it to provide legal insight. Here is the
first.
[T]he full body scan machine is also unreasonably in-
vasive and extensive. Both backscatter and millimeter
wave machines create a chalk-like image of the entire
body, likened to a "virtual strip search." American Civil
Liberties Union, ACLU Backgrounder on Body Scanners
and "Virtual Strip Searches", http://www.aclu.org/
technology-and-liberty/aclu-backgrounder-body-scanners-
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and-virtual-strip-searches (Jan. 8, 2011). They can even
capture a detailed portrait of one's face, although the
Transportation and Security Administration [TSA] or-
dered backscatters which are equipped with an algorithm
that blurs images to make faces unidentifiable, and it or-
dered millimeter wave machines to include technology to
blur facial features. TSA, Privacy: Advanced Imaging Tech-
nology, http://www. tsa.gov/approachtech/aitprivacy.shtm.
This brief likens a scan's chalk-like image of the body to a
strip search, but the analogy stops there. The writer never clari-
fies how a chalk outline is like the indignity of baring one's nude
body to a stranger or having one's bodily cavities probed. Indeed,
the analogy is rendered less convincing by the writer's subsequent
admissions that the individual's face is blurred and the image is
witnessed by an officer staring at a screen in a distant room. Per-
haps even more damaging, the writer never clarifies what is
gained if the court accepts the analogy.
Contrast these weaknesses with the analogy's development in
the second brief.
Because they reveal true-to-life contours of a passen-
ger's nude body, including his or her genitals, AIT body
scans amount to virtual strip searches and are thus over-
ly intrusive absent individualized suspicion. Strip
searches are maximally invasive and require individual-
ized suspicion even in the administrative context. Red-
ding, 129 S.C. at 2641-43 (school's search of a thirteen-
year-old student, involving "pulling out her bra and un-
derwear, was unreasonable absent reasonable suspicion
that the search would yield drugs."). Except in rare cir-
cumstances supported by objectively reasonable individ-
ualized suspicion, warrantless strip searches are almost
always unconstitutional. Sec. & Law Enforcement Empl.
v. Casey, 737 F.2d 187, 203-204 (2d Cir. 1984) (individu-
ally suspected corrections officer could be strip-searched
for limited purpose of controlling flow of contraband into
the prison) .... Thus characterized, without individual-
ized suspicion, AIT body scans of domestic air passengers
as a first-line screening method are overly intrusive.
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Here an arguable analogy between a body scan and actual
strip search is strengthened by visual details: the writer makes it
clear that the contour is of a "nude body" and specifically refers to
the visibility of female and male genitalia. These few details sug-
gest that what is seen in an AIT scan is similar to what is seen
when a search involves peering under a bra and into underwear.
More importantly, the consequences of accepting the analogy are
clear, namely, that even in the administrative search context, vir-
tual strip searches are impermissible unless other less intrusive
screenings have created individualized suspicion. The analogy
allows the writer to introduce a whole new line of cases.
2. Arguments Stemming from Role Reversal
One common way to explore a problem is to engage in role re-
versal. Often this means adopting the perspective of the opposing
party in order to better understand and mediate a conflict. The
technique can also be used to counter opposing perspectives, by
usurping, for example, the opposing party's argument. This hap-
pens in the following example, which puts an innovative and dif-
ferent spin on the government's contention that an exception to
the immediate custodian rule would allow forum shopping by
immigrant detainee habeas petitioners. The government's under-
lying policy concern is acknowledged, but the danger is attributed
to the opposing party.
Although the government argues the immediate cus-
todian rule is a strategy for minimizing forum-shopping
by alien habeas petitioners, the rule enables such forum-
shopping by the Government. In Farah, the practical ef-
fect of transferring the Petitioner out of state "was to
prevent him from filing his Petition while he was present
in this state. To now hold that Farah may only file his
Petition in the state that the INS determines to send him
would be to allow the INS to forum shop, intentionally or
not." Farah, 2002 WL 31828309 at *3. As in Farah, the
practical effect of Lima's transfer from Varick to Hudson
was to prevent him from filing in the District of Brook-
lyniana by moving him out of state and beyond the reach
of his attorney. His transfer from Hudson to Oakdale
similarly prevented his filing a habeas petition in New
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Jersey and moved him far beyond the reach of his re-
placement counsel to a forum chosen by Immigration and
Customs Enforcement. Whether intentionally or not, by
repeatedly transferring Lima just prior to his filing his
habeas petition and without informing him or his coun-
sel, the government was able to exercise complete discre-
tion as to where Lima could-and could not-file his peti-
tion for relief. Thus, even if the government did not act in
bad faith, the "practical effects" of the government's con-
duct is the same as if it acted in bad faith. Lima therefore
falls within the exception to the immediate custodian
rule.
By switching roles, writers can sometimes steal the oppo-
nent's thunder.
3. Re-characterization
Creative arguments also emerge by re-characterizing facts to
fit other causes of action or new defenses. In the passage below,
the writer argues that overly intrusive airport searches violate
not only an individual's right to privacy, but also give rise to a
constitutional violation of an individual's right to travel freely,
noting that "the constitutional right to travel may not be condi-
tioned upon the relinquishment of another constitutional
right... ... 34
Mr. Hanson has the right to travel in interstate
commerce. Edwards v. Cal., 314 U.S. 160, 172-73 (1941).
Passenger screenings that are more intrusive than neces-
sary run the risk of discouraging interstate commerce,
however. Although older cases like Davis and its progeny
said that as long as passengers had the choice to "opt-
out" of flying and travel by other means, there was no in-
terference with the right to travel, 482 F.2d at 910-11,
abrogated by Aukai, 497 F.3d at 960-62, those cases were
decided when air travel was prohibitively expensive for a
large segment of the population and passengers had oth-
er viable and common travel options. Since airlines were
34. U.S. v. Davis, 482 F.2d 843, 912-913 (9th Cir. 1973).
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deregulated thirty-five years ago, fares have dropped
dramatically, opening access to air travel to ever greater
percentages of Americans. Stephen Breyer, Airline De-
regulation, Revisited, Bloomberg Businessweek,
http://www.businessweek.comfbwdaily/dnflash/content/ a
n2011/jan2Oll/db20110120-138711.htm (Jan. 20, 2011).
Moreover, given its history of frequent airline bailouts,
the federal government clearly recognizes the centrality
of air travel. Coupled with federal and state neglect of in-
tercity passenger rail, domestic interstate air travel has
become the sine qua non of travel and interstate com-
merce. Providing a passenger with the choice between
flying and enjoying Fourth Amendment protection forces
their consent at the sacrifice of constitutional rights, re-
sulting in "considerable hardship." U.S. v. Albarado, 495
F.2d 799, 806-807 (2d Cir. 1974). Thus, the government
should not place unreasonable restrictions on the right to
travel freely.
Here, one student categorized intrusive airport searches as a
Fourth Amendment violation and a violation of the right to travel,
the latter argument functioning as an argument for why it is dis-
ingenuous to say that air travel is a luxury, not a necessity. Given
this necessity, "consent" to a search is coerced, not voluntary.
4. Extension & Transfer
New ideas can come from transferring legal concepts from
one domain to another or from extending a line of reasoning to
new situations. As one professor notes, sometimes "a body of law
designed to remedy particular harms or wrongs . . . may be ex-
tended as we recognize appropriate new members of a category."35
Examples of exporting include using public trust doctrine in envi-
ronmental law or applying traditional property principles to new
forms of property like welfare and other government entitle-
ments.36 In the example below, the right of an owner or lessee to
challenge the constitutionality of a search is extended to an unau-
35. Menkel-Meadows, supra n. 23, at 130.
36. Id.
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thorized driver of a rental car who has the lessee's permission to
use it because the expectation of privacy is similar.
Supreme Court precedent makes it clear that a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy may be shown "either by
reference to concepts of real or personal property law or
to understandings that are recognized and permitted by
society." Rakas v. Ill., 439 U.S. 128, 144 n. 12 (1978). The
Court has made it painstakingly clear, however, that "ar-
cane distinctions" governing property law ought not to
control. Id. at 149 n. 17.
With respect to the first prong, the Court has admit-
ted that "one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls
property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy by virtue of [his] right to exclude." Id. In-
deed, the Rakas Court explained the holding of two lead-
ing Supreme Court cases largely in these terms. See e.g.
Rakas, 49 U.S. at 149 (concluding that the defendant in
Jones v. U.S., 362 U.S. 257 (1960), had a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy because he "had complete dominion
and control over the [property] and could exclude others
from it," and emphasizing the fact that the defendant in
Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967), had "shut the door be-
hind him to exclude all others"). Not surprisingly, courts
have applied the reasoning of Rakas by adopting a modi-
fied bright-line rule toward unauthorized drivers. For ex-
ample, the Ninth Circuit grants standing to unauthorized
drivers "upon a showing of 'joint control' or 'common au-
thority' over the property searched." U.S. v. Thomas, 447
F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2006). Similarly, the Second
Circuit has noted that an unauthorized driver of a rental
car "may legitimately conclude that the car is his during
the time he has permission to use it" and that his exer-
cise of "dominion and control" over the vehicles gives him
a legitimate expectation of privacy. U.S. v. Little, 945 F.
Supp. 79, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 133 F.3d 908 (2d Cir.
1998).
In a progression from an owner's, tenant's, or guest's recog-
nized privacy rights in a home to the rights of a person in a phone
booth, the author shows that the steady extension of privacy
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rights justifies recognizing the privacy rights of an unauthorized
driver of a rental car who was given permission to use it by a les-
see.
5. Detailed Application of Law to Fact
A detailed application of law to fact can lead to a more nu-
anced understanding of both the law and the narrative. In the
first example below, the discussion of repercussions stemming
from a city employee's demotion for the exercise of her free speech
rights rounds out the meaning of irreparable harm and shows
why monetary damages do not sufficiently redress her injuries.
The unique interplay of the circumstances surround-
ing Ms. Rodriguez's demotion also establishes irreparable
harm. The Third Circuit does not usually grant injunc-
tive relief for lost wages and other monetary damages
that can be redressed at trial. See Singh v. School Dist. of
Phila., No. 10-2028, 2010 WL 3220336, at *6 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 11, 2010). However, a denial of Ms. Rodriguez's mo-
tion for reinstatement and the resulting monetary losses
implicate a complex web of issues that stretch beyond
mere monetary damage. If Ms. Rodriguez were to remain
in her inferior, new job to pay her education loans, she
will be abandoning the career aspirations that initially
inspired her to earn the education that caused her debt.
On the other hand, if Ms. Rodriguez were to leave her in-
ferior administrative position to pursue her career aspi-
rations, she may suffer the stress that comes from debt,
potential eviction, and harassment of creditors. Aside
from these considerations, the demotion itself will severe-
ly impede the progress of Ms. Rodriguez's career in civil
service. See Iles v. De Jongh, Civil. Nos. 2007/0094,
2007/0053, 2007/0019, 2009 WL 44349475, at *7 (D.V.I.
Nov. 24, 2009) (concluding two government employees
suffered irreparable harm as a result of loss in job title
and reputation). The repercussions of these options show
that regardless of Ms. Rodriguez's course of action, the
end result will be irreparable harm to her career and
emotional stability. This consideration, in conjunction
with the chilling effect that the defendant's retaliation
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has levied on her freedom of expressive association, indi-
cate that immediate reinstatement to her previous posi-
tion of Assistant to the Director of Communications in
the Office of the Mayor is the only remedy that will pre-
vent Ms. Rodriguez from suffering irreparable harm. See
Firetree v. Creedon, No. 1:08-CV-0245, 2008 WL 2078152,
at *6.
Damage to her career and the stress that results from that,
as well as from potential harassment from creditors, are all
harms that cannot be redressed by a monetary award. In con-
trast, in the next example, the writer mostly ignores the non-
tangible harms the plaintiff faces and tries with lesser effect to
prove that her monetary harms constitute such extraordinary
hardship that it is irreparable harm.
While monetary harm does not constitute irreparable
injury, Ms. Rodriguez's injuries represent extraordinary
hardship remediable only by a preliminary injunction.
Ms. Rodriguez's demotion reduced her salary, and she
now faces the bleak prospect of being evicted from her
apartment and defaulting on her student loans. Rodri-
guez Decl. 16. Defaulting on her loans will result in ad-
verse action by the government and severely damage her
credit score. Reinstating Ms. Rodriguez will delay these
harms until the end of the trial and prevent her from be-
ing thrown into a spiral of debt and financial distress.
Thus, injunctive relief is necessary to prevent Ms. Rodri-
guez from suffering irreparable harm to her financial sit-
uation.
This may be a legitimate secondary argument, but because
the author misses the chance to marshal facts that speak more
directly to the standard, this is a "B+" rather than an "A" argu-
ment.
C. Artful Writing
1. Persuasive Sequencing and Perfect Pitch
Studies of human decision-making suggest that the order in
which persuasive messages are presented influences their suc-
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cess. 37 Those organizations that "'prime' the reader by leading
her, step-by-step, toward acceptance of the final thesis" 38 are the
most successful. This "priming" involves constructing a chain of
overlapping propositions "so the acceptance of one proposition
leads inexorably to the next."39
One frequently successful chain-the foot-in-the-door strate-
gy--opens with an attractive, fairly uncontroversial premise, "on
the theory that if the reader agrees with the first few premises,
she is more likely to accept the ultimate thesis."40 This strategy
also "has the advantage of subtlety" since research shows that
argument "is more persuasive if the intent to persuade is not ob-
vious." 41 Readers like to believe they have "independently arrived
at the decision .... Preserving the appearance of audience auton-
omy lessens the likelihood that the audience will feel coerced and
angry, feelings which can lead to the so-called 'boomerang effect'
in which the message recipient responds to the persuasive mes-
sage by rejecting it."42
The appearance of autonomy is not the only thing that writ-
ers should strive for, however. They need to actually give readers
space to make their own decisions, especially because overt pres-
sure and confrontational demands may be perceived as offensive,
threatening, and therefore counter-productive. Thus, writers need
to reconcile advocacy with respect and "calibrate the force of a
plea, assertion, demand, request, or refusal,"43 finding the perfect
pitch.
A second organizational strategy-the door-in-the-face strat-
egy--opens with a more controversial premise that the reader
37. Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion: An Initial Exploration, 2006 Mich.
St. L. Rev. 411, 415.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 417.
41. Michael J. Higdon, Something Judicious This Way Comes . . . The Use of Fore-
shadowing as a Persuasive Device in Judicial Narrative, 44 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1213, 1224
(2010) (citing Frank R. Kardes, Spontaneous Inference Processes in Advertising: The Effects
of Conclusion, Omission, and Involvement on Persuasion, 15 J. Consumer Res. 225, 225
(1988) (citing Elaine Walster & Leon Festinger, The Effectiveness of "Overheard" Persua-
sive Communications, 65 J. Abnormal & Soc. Psychol. 395, 401 (1962))).
42. Stanchi, supra n. 37, at 422 (citing Michael Burgoon et al., Revisiting the Theory of
Psychological Resistance: Communicating Threat to Attitudinal Freedom, in The Persua-
sion Handbook: Developments in Theory and Practice 213, 215-216 (James Price Dillard &
Michael Pfau eds., Sage Publications 2002)).
43. Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, The Art of Indirection, 14 Persps. 21, 22 (2005).
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may likely reject. This strategy operates on the theory that the
reader, "having rejected the first larger request, is thereafter
somewhat more inclined to acquiesce to a second, smaller re-
quest. '44 When this strategy works, it is because the sequence of
requests operates like a negotiation, where one party's concession
is reciprocated by the other party.45 "Door-in-the-face is not as
consistently successful as foot-in-the-door, however, and can de-
pend on context."46
In the introductions of the following two trial briefs, students
make similar points but employ different strategies. The first has
good pitch and is artfully framed and sequenced, while the other
struggles with sequence, emphasis, and tone.
(I)
The writ of habeas corpus is an indispensable foun-
dation to the integrity of our system of justice. For cen-
turies this basic right has proved a bulwark against in-
sidious government overreach and has served as a last
refuge for those whose most basic liberty has been wrong-
fully taken from them. Granting Jose Lima's petition for
habeas relief is appropriate here because Lima properly
named the Attorney General ("AG") as the respondent to
his petition for immigration habeas relief since Congress
granted the AG authority in matters of immigration de-
tention and removal. If Lima's immediate custodian is
the respondent, the warden of Lima's detention center in
Louisiana, his access to justice is impaired. It is to avoid
this kind of scenario that the writ of habeas corpus was
enshrined in our Constitution.
Recognizing the AG's authority is essential because
the stakes are high when it comes to answering the prop-
er respondent question. This court has already noted that
Petitioner has a meritorious claim in his habeas petition
and that Petitioner's ability to participate in his parallel
Immigration Court proceedings depend on his release
44. Stanchi, supra n. 37, at 427.
45. Id. at 427-428. Stanchi says this strategy is a bit like arguing in the alternative.
Id. at 431.
46. Id. at 427.
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from detention a distant and overcrowded center in Loui-
siana and his return to Brooklyn. In addition, there is
substantial evidence of Immigration and Customs En-
forcement misconduct in this case. If the court accepts
the Government's arguments that the proper respondent
in alien habeas petitions such as this one falls within the
immediate custodian rule, the Government's ability to
willfully transfer a detainee far from counsel and his de-
pendent family and counsel-and away from his ongoing
challenge to his removal from the United States-will be
unchecked and the interests of justice preserved in the
writ of habeas corpus will not be served. As such, the mo-
tion to dismiss should be denied.
(II)
In this classic example of bullying by the United
States government, the Petitioner Jose Lima is simply
asking for the opportunity to be heard in court and be re-
united with his wife and young son. Mr. Lima's petition
for a writ of habeas corpus arises out of an arrest not for
committing a crime, but for being in the wrong place at
the wrong time after supporting a piece of legislation
which would allow him to remain in the country he has
known to come and love since he was brought here at the
age of three. But, as a result of his unfortunate arrest
and cruel transfer to Western Louisiana, where he is de-
prived of adequate counsel and more importantly contact
with his loved ones, Petitioner Lima now requests that
this Court find that the Attorney General is the proper
respondent and deny the motion to dismiss.
The petitioner is asking that the immediate custodi-
an rule, which applies to normal federal prisoners, be ig-
nored in favor of a rule which would provide more equal
justice to all immigration detainees. In being allowed to
name the Attorney General as respondent to his petition,
Petitioner Lima would be recognizing the Attorney Gen-
eral's unique role in immigration that gives him wide-
spread control. The government is hoping to maintain
the immediate custodian rule so it can continue its mis-
treatment of hard working American residents, just try-
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ing to support their families home and abroad, by isolat-
ing them in distant and overcrowded detention centers,
thereby making it nearly impossible to have a petition
granted.
The first example follows the foot-in-the-door strategy. The
student's brief opens by reminding the reader that the writ of ha-
beas corpus is a cornerstone of the American system of justice.
Counting on the readers' comfort with this foundational principle,
the writer hopes it will lead her to accept the next thesis, namely,
that the ICR wrongly deprives illegal aliens like Lima of habeas
relief, and thus the court should recognize an exception to the
rule.
Buttressing this structure is the writer's effort to pitch the
petitioner's dilemma to the audience's core values and beliefs,47
namely, the fundamental right to judicial access. Arguments that
are highly relevant to personal experiences, values, or beliefs
have been shown to actively engage the reader in close examina-
tion of the merits.48 Thus the second paragraph sympathetically
frames what is at stake for Lima, while secondarily hinting at
evidence of nefarious government dealing, a situation that invites
the reader's serious consideration. The paragraph ends tying the
issues back to the underlying reasons for the writ of habeas cor-
pus, powerfully framing the argument.
The second example makes essentially the same points, but
uses the more contentious door-in-the-face strategy49 in the hope
that the recipient will concede to a second, smaller request in re-
ciprocation for rejecting the first. Here, the opening two conten-
tions will likely be rejected because the tone is so aggressive and
heavy handed, as in, "this is a classic example of bullying by the
United States government," and the government supports the
immediate custodian rule only "so it can continue its mistreat-
ment of hardworking American residents." These statements are
so unequivocal that they rob the reader of the right to make au-
tonomous decisions about the government's tactics and motiva-
tions. They may also collide with some readers' more positive at-
titude toward government, causing them to generate counter-
47. Id. at 445.
48. Id. at 434-441
49. Id. at 426-427.
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arguments. Moreover, the reader may decide that instead of es-
tablishing a bargaining dialogue, which depends on the first
premise being sufficiently reasonable so as not to generate a hos-
tile response, 50 the first premise is so farfetched that there is no
obligation to reciprocate by conceding to the second request,
which asks the Attorney General to be recognized as Lima's im-
mediate custodian, and the respondent to Lima's petition. The
strategy here could well have a boomerang effect.
Equally problematic, the door-in-the-face strategy here has
some undesirable substantive repercussions. By characterizing
the government's conduct as "bullying" and "mistreatment," the
advocate appears to concede the need to show bad faith, instead of
inadvertent or inefficient bureaucratic confusion that has the
same practical effect on Lima's right to access but a lower burden
of proof.5 1 A similar-if less serious-thing happens when the ad-
vocate says "as a result of his unfortunate arrest and cruel trans-
fer to Western Louisiana, ... [Lima was] deprived of adequate
counsel and, more importantly, contact with his loved ones."
While we recognize the student's desire to humanize the petition-
er, in the context of this litigation, "contact with loved ones" is
less important than deprivation of counsel. Here, a carelessly
used intensifier inverts the relative importance of the arguments,
demonstrating how inartful writing can interfere with the weight
of the arguments.
Finally, there are other ill-considered word choices. The prose
is sometimes clich6d, "the country he has known to come [sic] and
love," or "just trying to support their families home and abroad."
However well intended composition teachers call such phrases
"instant prose," clich6d expressions that spill out "without
thought or commitment and almost without effort." 52 Without
effort, the prose may make the point but be too insipid to spark
interest or empathy. In addition, the prose in the second example
is at times inopportune: "The petitioner is asking the immediate
custodian rule, which applies to normal federal prisoners, be ig-
nored in favor of a rule which would provide more equal justice to
50. Id. at 432.
51. The "bad faith" argument should be the fallback argument in case the "practical
effects" argument fails.
52. Sylvan Barnet & Marcia Stubbs, Barnet & Stubb's Practical Guide to Writing 177
(Little, Brown & Co. 1975).
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all immigration detainees." "Ignores" suggests that the court
should willfully disregard the law rather than contend with it, a
suggestion courts are unlikely to find palatable. It would be more
diplomatic and more accurate to say instead that "the immediate
custodian rule, which applies to normal federal prisoners, does
not now and should not extend to immigration detainees." This
sentence also has some obfuscating adjectives: should we infer
from the wording that there is a different rule for "abnormal fed-
eral prisoners" than for "normal" prisoners"? Here, poor strategic
choices and writing that veers between banal, overzealous, and
imprecise damage the advocate's credibility and weaken other-
wise sound substantive arguments.
2. Foreshadowing and Framing
In most legal documents, both persuasive and objective, a key
decision is how to "prime" the audience to lead the reader step-by-
step to a final thesis. One technique involves foreshadowing.
Foreshadowing works by projecting a "backwards causality,"53
where an "early scene simultaneously predicts and confirms a
future that then appears as an inevitability, the only course this
story could have taken."54 It works "by unobtrusively planting
clues early on, [which] can help control the creation of. . . hypoth-
eses, leading the viewer-seemingly on her own-to the conclu-
sion the writer will ultimately be advocating."55
a. Using Facts to Foreshadow Thesis
Because there are almost always rival interpretations of sto-
ries, using facts to foreshadow a thesis must be done artfully.
The historical reconstruction that makes up much of
storytelling is considered more trustworthy if it simply
presents the facts without any instrumental or prede-
termined direction .... Despite occasional reminders
that this convention embraces a cognitive impossibility
and open acknowledgment that it is often at odds with
53. Higdon, supra n. 41, at 1226 (citing Gary Saul Morson, Narrative and Freedom:
The Shadows of Time 11 (1994)).
54. Id. at 1227 (quoting Nancy Welch, Sideshadowing Teacher Response, 60 College
English 374, 378 (1998)).
55. Id. at 1244.
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the instrumental nature of remedying-seeking stories,
most cultures abide by and even exalt the pretense
that what happened can be found and reported without
bias. 56
To be credible, a historical reconstruction must be consistent
with the evidence. But within these confines, legal writers must
try to make one outcome seem more legitimate than another
without being too obvious. Often this is done by briefly foreshad-
owing the client's story in order to frame and diminish negative
information, using affective or cognitive priming. Affective prim-
ing establishes a mood, setting, or characterization that will elicit
the affective response desired-compassion, indignation, or fear.
Cognitive priming involves planting schemas, news flashes, or
ideas that readers can quickly retrieve to help evaluate argu-
ments. 57
In the example that follows, a seemingly unbiased historical
reconstruction of the petitioner's biography makes the opening
paragraph in the first statement of facts seem credible. It details
facts favorable to Lima, but does so without embellishments, in-
deed without adjectives. Thus it directs the reader's attention to
the petitioner's hard work and worthy activities, but leaves it to
the reader to infer Lima's good character. This positive impres-
sion of him makes the reader sensitive to Lima's fright and fate
when ICE agents swarm the building, slam on the apartment
door, and storm in. These Gestapo tactics, conveyed with effective
verbs only, makes Lima's later contentions of government bad
faith seem possible.
(I)
Jose Lima arrived in the United States in 1987 from
Guatemala at the age of three and has spent the last
twenty-three years-nearly all of his life-residing in
Brooklyn, New York. He attended New York City public
schools, where he participated in athletics and graduated
with academic honors. He is married to Carmela Mar-
tinez, a lawful permanent resident, and is a parent with
56. Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 32 (1984).
57. Higdon, supra n. 41, at 1230-1231.
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Martinez to an eighteen-month-old son, Ernesto Lima, a
United States citizen. Lima works over forty hours a
week at the electronics store in Brooklyn to provide for
his wife and child and has never been convicted of any
crime in the United States.
Lima's Arrest
On October 16, 2010, Lima participated in a peaceful
rally in support of immigrant's rights in Huntingdon,
New York, and stayed overnight at a friend's house. As
he slept quietly, armed Immigration and Customs En-
forcement agents swarmed around the apartment build-
ing and slammed on the door. They then stormed through
the apartment, waking Lima with a flashlight in his face,
while demanding to see his papers. Discovering he was
from Guatemala, the agents handcuffed Lima and
marched him into a van.
The effective use of facts is as important in the argument as
they are in the statement. Opening the argument section with
key underlying facts is one good way of getting the reader's atten-
tion, as in this introduction arguing that full body scans and en-
hanced pat-downs at airports are reasonable at inception. The
thesis paragraph opens with a litany of facts that persuasively
foreshadow the conclusion.
The courts have emphasized the grave and urgent
nature of the special need of battling airborne terrorism.
See Davis, 482 F.3d at 270 and City of Indianapolis v.
Edmund, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). In the post-9/11 United
States, "[the] government.. .has the most compelling rea-
sons-the safety of hundreds of lives and millions of dol-
lars' worth of private property-for subjecting airline
passengers to a search for weapons or explosives that
could be used to hijack an airplane." See Singleton v.
Commr. of Internal Revenue, 606 F.2d 50, 52 (3d Cir.
1979).... Modern-day terrorists now employ previously
inconceivable tactics in the mission to destroy American
lives and property. Their arsenal is no longer "confined to
the cumbersome gun or knife .. .for modern technology
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has made it possible ... that enough plastic explosives to
blow up an airplane can be concealed in a toothpaste
tube." Moreno. Recent terrorist activity has proven this
all too terrifying reality. In 2006, British authorities un-
covered an A1-Qaeda plot to "blow up United States-
bound airliners" by mixing household liquids "into an ex-
plosive cocktail." Alan Cowell, Britain Charges 11 in
Plane Case; Bomb Gear Cited, N.Y. Times (Aug. 22,
2006). Nigerian terrorist Abdul Farouk Abdulmutallab
went to similarly unimaginable lengths on Christmas
Day 2009, immediately preceding the government's de-
ployment of AIT and pat-down procedures at airports
across the nation, by attempting to detonate a mixture of
nonmetallic powders and liquid he had concealed in his
underwear. Anahad O'Connor & Eric Schmitt, Terror At-
tempt Seen as Man Tries to Ignite Device on Jet, N.Y.
Times (Dec. 25, 2009). These alarming attempts empha-
size the government's absolute need to adapt the way in
which it "approached the task of ensuring the safety and
security of the" nation's air transportation. See United
States v. Aukai and Cassidy v. Chertoff (holding that pre-
vention of terrorist attacks on large vessels engaged in
mass transportation and determined by the Coast Guard
to be at heightened risk of attack constitutes a special
need.)
Unlike magnetometers, both advanced imaging tech-
nology and enhanced pat-down procedures can detect the
kinds of nonmetallic weapons and explosives that stocked
the liquid bombers' and underwear bomber's arsenals....
Because these procedures discover hidden dangers and
prevent their development "before the lives of an air-
plane's passengers and crew are endangered," they are
classic administrative searches. Therefore both AIT and
pat-down screening procedures are reasonable at incep-
tion.
The magnitude of the terrorist threat, conveyed in a crescen-
do of cases and newspaper articles reporting different terrorist
weapons and attempts, plays on the audience's fears and makes it
responsive to the conclusion that the need to thwart terrorism
outweighs the reasonably circumscribed intrusions on individual
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privacy. The writer effectively uses both affective and cognitive
priming.
b. Inoculating against Adverse Information
Many advocates "minimize the 'airtime' given to negative in-
formation because of the worry that space devoted to adverse
points will inflate their importance or unduly highlight them."5 8
Others think a preemptive strike is more effective, especially
when a different spin on the negative information neutralizes its
harm. One way to undermine opposing arguments is to foreshad-
ow them, inoculating readers against them.59 Research has
shown that the key to inoculation is to warn of an "impending at-
tack or threat" and then to provide "antibodies" that resist the
attack.60 When the threat is sufficiently scary, the recipient is
likely to be open to the advocate's refutation. 61
An adverse decision comes under a two-fold attack in the fol-
lowing student brief on a state statute prohibiting unmarried
couples from adopting.
This Court should not follow the Lofton court's decision to
ban homosexuals from adopting due to a lack of well-
established evidence. Lofton v. Sec. of Dept. of Children
& Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (Fla. 2004). First, when
research is inclusive, it is especially dangerous to base
law on assumptions; this is precarious territory that the
court should not cross. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204
(1976). Second, individualized determination is a superi-
or method of evaluating parental fitness. In Stanley v. Il-
linois, Justice White called procedures based on pre-
sumption "cheap" in comparison to individualized deter-
mination. 405 U.S. at 656. It disregards the real inter-
ests of children and defers to outdated formalities instead
of present realities. Id. at 657. The adoption process is
already an intense public procedure where the adopters'
lives must go under the microscope of the state. Lindley
58. Stanchi, supra n. 37, at 390.
59. Id. at 399-400.
60. Id. at 401.
61. The thesis paragraph in section II(C)(2)(a) on airborne terrorism turns on this
dynamic.
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v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1989). There is no
need to limit the application pool even further when each
couple will be individually evaluated. To take the easy
way out by barring unmarried couples on the assumption
that they are unfit does not serve in the best interests of
the child and weighs heavily on the matter of equal pro-
tection.
Attacking the opposing argument using Supreme Court prec-
edent and a core appeal to the best interest of children, the stu-
dent here swiftly combats the Lofton decision.
III. CONCLUSION
Because grades depend on balancing a variety of factors, in-
stitutional and individual, it is impossible to assure students that
the value-added factors discussed above will result in an "A"
grade. But it also seems true that an "A" might require more than
clear organization, competent analysis, and reasonably profes-
sional presentation. A paper with all those qualities might, as
Professor Franklin has said, back into an "A," especially in
schools with a mandatory curve, but true "A" work is not simply
about perfecting the first four levels of Bloom's hierarchy of cogni-
tive development. It is also about nuanced evaluation, independ-
ent thought, and finesse in execution. These finer details require
attentiveness to the validity of evidence, malleability of law, and
impact of language. These are the factors that make a paper
"sing." They are rarely achieved easily because they require con-
scious thought and frequent refining. But they can be explained
and discussed and that discussion may edge students closer to the
finish line.
2012]

